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NONCONSENSUAL HIV TESTING IN THE HEALTH
CARE SETTING: THE CASE FOR EXTENDING
THE OCCUPATIONAL PROTECTIONS
OF CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 96
TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981 the fatal progression of symptoms that later came to be
known as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first de-
scribed in medical literature.' More than a decade later, the causative
agent has been isolated-a virus now called the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV).2 Scientists have learned that AIDS is trans-
mitted by commingling blood or body fluids with those of an infected
person,3 and there are now serological tests4 that can detect exposure to
the virus.' However, in spite of a worldwide outpouring of scientific re-
search, neither a reliable vaccine nor a cure is on the horizon.6
AIDS is not spread by casual contact. Nevertheless, convincing the
public to treat victims with compassion and understanding has proven to
be a daunting task.' Recognizing the need to protect HIV-positive per-
sons from unwarranted discrimination in housing, education and em-
1. STEPHEN A. FLANDERS & CARL N. FLANDERS, AIDS 58 (1991). The Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) reported on the unusual cases of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia that
had been observed in the preceding months. Id.; see also RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND
PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1988) (relating history of early
days of AIDS epidemic).
2. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 7-8; Susan W. Barnett & Jay A. Levy,
Human Immunodeficiency Viruses, in MANUAL OF CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY 1011, 1011 (Al-
bert Balows et al. eds., 5th ed. 1991).
3. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 18-20; Barnett & Levy, supra note 2, at
1013.
4. Serological tests are those that test the body's immune response to infection by mea-
suring serum antibody levels. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1511 (27th
ed. 1988). See infra note 29 for a description of the serological tests most commonly used to
detect the HIV antibody.
5. Barnett & Levy, supra note 2, at 1014-17; Judith C. Wilber, HIV Antibody Testing:
Methodology, in THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-1 to 2.1.2-5 (P.T. Cohen et al.
eds., 1990).
6. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 27-29; see also Christine Gorman, Invinci-
ble AIDS, TIME, Aug. 3, 1992, at 30, 34 (describing current status of worldwide AIDS epi-
demic and difficulties in finding effective treatment or vaccine).
7. Citizens Comm'n on AIDS for N.Y. City and Northern N.J., AIDS Prevention and
Educatiorn Reframing the Message, 3 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 147, 147-48 (1991).
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ployment, both Congress' and many states9 have passed laws specifically
forbidding such practices.
Antidiscrimination laws have been only part of the legislative re-
sponse. States also have recognized the need for testing and early treat-
ment, especially in high-risk population groups.10 Yet many persons
resist being tested, fearing that the results of a positive test will become
publicly known." To protect the privacy of tested individuals, many
states, including California, have enacted special statutes to safeguard the
confidentiality of HIV-related information.12
At one time, a major component of AIDS law in California was that
no one could be tested without first giving written consent.1 3 However, it
soon became obvious that such all-encompassing rules went too far.
Convinced that in some instances there was a compelling need for non-
consensual testing in order to slow the spread of AIDS, the California
Legislature passed several exceptions to the consent requirement in 1988.
These exceptions permitted nonconsensual testing of prisoners, convicted
prostitutes and sex offenders. 4
In 1988, voters also passed Proposition 96, a ballot initiative al-
lowing law enforcement, fire and rescue personnel, custodial personnel
and victims of sexual crimes to petition the court to order HIV testing of
the person who may have exposed them to the virus.15 This option, how-
ever, was restricted to the criminal context and was not extended to
health care workers who also run the risk of exposure on a daily basis.
1 6
8. See infra notes 63-85, 172-74 and accompanying text.
9. Larry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regu-
latory Policy in the United States, 261 JAMA 1621, 1628 (1989).
10. See infra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of high-risk groups.
11. Barry R. Furrow, AIDS and the Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary
HIV Testing, 34 VILL. L. REv. 823, 828-31 (1989).
12. See, ag., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd 1992); N.Y. PUB, HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney
Supp. 1993); see also Gostin, supra note 9, at 1622-23 (listing states that have HIV confidenti-
ality statutes).
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West 1990).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West Supp. 1993) (permitting HIV testing of con-
victed sex offenders); id § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1993) (permitting HIV testing of repeat prosti-
tution offenders); iad § 750i (West Supp. 1993) (permitting HIV testing of prisoners).
15. Proposition 96, 1988 Cal. Stat. A-271 to -274 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 199.95-.99 (West 1990)).
16. Health care workers are usually exposed by contaminated needlesticks. Linda S. Bil-
liet et al., Needlestick Injury Rate Reduction During Phlebotomy: A Comparative Study of Two
Safety Devices, 22 LABORATORY MED. 120, 120 (1991). Current studies estimate that the risk
of becoming HIV positive from a single contaminated needlestick is less than one percent. J.
Louise Gerberding & Merle A. Sande, Accidental Parenteral or Mucous Membrane Exposure to
HIV, in THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 10.2.9-1, 10.2.9-1 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 1990).
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As the law now stands, a physician, nurse, laboratory technician or any
other health care worker who suffers an exposure from a patient whose
HIV status is unknown cannot compel that patient to be tested without
written consent.17 Without knowing whether they are potentially in-
fected, these workers must wait and worry. The exposed health care
worker faces the dilemma of whether to obtain early prophylactic treat-
ment, whether to change sexual practices so as not to endanger sexual
partners, and if the exposed worker is a female of childbearing age,
whether to refrain from attempts to become pregnant or to continue a
pregnancy. 8 These questions cannot be answered without knowing as
many facts as possible, the most important being the HIV status of the
patient in question. The psychological stress in such a situation can be
overwhelming.' 9 This was the rationale behind the voter initiative that
placed Proposition 96 on the California ballot in 1988.20
This Comment addresses patient rights under current California
consent and confidentiality laws, particularly those that relate to AIDS
and HIV,2' as well as the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.22 It also addresses the inequita-
ble distribution of burdens under current law in the context of the legal
and ethical duty of physicians and other health care providers to treat
AIDS and HIV-infected patients.23 This Comment concludes that any
health care worker who can document an exposure to blood or body
fluids should have the option to have a nonconsenting patient tested for
HIV.
2 4
Other means of exposure include mucocutaneous inoculation (such as splashing blood into the
eye or other mucous membrane) and prolonged cutaneous contact when the area of contact is
chapped, abraded or afflicted with dermatitis. Id.
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West 1990).
18. HIV can cross the placenta during pregnancy via the circulatory system, thereby in-
fecting the developing fetus. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 20; Barnett & Levy,
supra note 2, at 1013.
19. See Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1266-67, 267 Cal. Rptr.
666, 671-73 (1990) (testimony of expert witnesses); infra notes 224-25, 228-29 and accompany-
ing text.
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West 1990). The stated purpose of Proposi-
tion 96 is to protect the health and safety of the public, peace officers, firefighters, victims of
sexual crimes and custodial personnel by requiring that when such persons are exposed they
may "be relieved from groundless fear of infection." Id
21. See infra part II.C.2.
22. See infra part IV.
23. See infra part III.A.
24. See infra parts III-V. On March 2, 1993, Senator Newton Russell introduced a bill
into the California Senate which would permit nonconsensual testing of patients for HIV
under certain conditions. S. 627, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993). This bill allows a health care
worker who has suffered a "significant exposure" to a patient's blood or body fluids to have a
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The AIDS Epidemic. A Gloomy Forecast
AIDS is a slowly progressive fatal illness characterized by suppres-
sion of the immune system, which leaves the host open to a variety of
opportunistic infections.2" Once infected, a person might not develop the
symptoms of full-blown AIDS for years.26 These individuals carry the
virus in their blood and body fluids and are capable of transmitting it to
others, even though they appear to be perfectly healthy. After the virus
invades the body and begins to replicate, an antibody response is stimu-
lated in the host.2'
Serological tests now have been developed that can detect antibodies
specific to HIV.28 Generally, these tests are reliable and accurate when
previously legally obtained specimen tested for HIV without consent provided that: (1) a physi-
cian certifies in writing that there has been a significant exposure; (2) the health care employee
first submits to a baseline HIV test which is negative; (3) a good faith effort to obtain voluntary
informed consent is made (by someone other than the exposed employee) after notifying the
patient of the exposure; (4) the patient who refused consent is notified that the test will be
performed, and that the results of the test will be made available to the patient, if desired,
along with appropriate counseling; and (5) the exposed employee is advised that all informa-
tion, including information relating to the identity or HIV status of the source patient, is
subject to statutory confidentiality protection and may not be further disclosed. Id.
The legislation now under consideration has one major advantage over the proposal ad-
vanced in this Comment-it treats both patient and employee fairly without incurring addi-
tional expenses in legal fees or involving the court's time. Senate bill 627 does not, however,
cover those cases in which there is no blood sample available to be tested. See id. An appro-
priate compromise would incorporate the best of both-the provisions of Senate bill 627 would
apply to those situations in which a blood sample is available for testing; if no specimen is
available, the exposed employee may petition the court to comple the patient to submit to
testing.
25. Barnett & Levy, supra note 2, at 1011-12. Some of the opportunistic diseases suffered
by AIDS patients include Kaposi's sarcoma, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, cryptosporidial
diarrhea, cryptococcal meningitis, toxoplasmosis and dementia. Id. at 1011.
26. Id. Recently, the federal government has expanded the definition of exactly what is
required for a diagnosis of "AIDS." CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1993 Revised Classifi-
cation System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among
Adolescents and Adults, MORBIDrrY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP., Dec. 18, 1992, at 1, 1, 4.
Previously a person was diagnosed with AIDS when he or she contracted any one of a list of
23 conditions after becoming HIV positive. Id Under the new criteria, two more conditions
commonly seen in intravenous drug abuse-pulmonary tuberculosis and recurrent pneumo-
nia-are diagnostic. Id Additionally, AIDS is diagnosed when the number of a special type
of white blood cell that HIV seems to particularly affect drops below a specified standard (CD4
lymphocytes less than 200 per cubic millimeter). Id The definition now includes some dis-
eases unique to women, such as invasive cervical cancer, which is a reflection of the rising toll
of AIDS among heterosexuals. Id at 7-8; see also Keith Stone, U.S. Expands Definition of
AIDS Patient, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 1993, at 1, 9 (describing new CDC standards for
AIDS diagnosis).
27. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 13.
28. Id at 8; Wilber, supra note 5, at 2.1.2-1.
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performed by qualified technologists in licensed laboratories.29 They
have been approved since 1985 to screen the nation's blood supply3" and
to test individuals for HIV infection.
HIV antibody tests, however, are not an infallible indicator of a per-
son's infective status.31 They are not designed to test for the presence of
the virus itself, but only for the presence of antibodies to the virus.32 It
may be weeks or months before an infected individual seroconverts. 3
Therefore, a negative test does not necessarily mean that a person is free
of the virus-subsequent testing at regular intervals is recommended to
monitor an individual's HIV status.3' At the present time, however, a
positive HIV antibody test is the best indicator that a person is infected
and capable of transmitting the virus to someone else.35
Currently, zidovudine (AZT) is widely recognized as having limited
efficacy in slowing the progress of the disease.36 AZT is not a cure, nor is
a cure on the immediate horizon.37 The length of time a victim can sur-
vive after infection varies from months to years, but once the active dis-
ease manifests itself it has proven to be ultimately fatal.38
29. The most commonly used test methodology is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent as-
say (ELISA), supplemented by a Western Blot test. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at
8; see Wilber, supra note 5, at 2.1.2-1. ELISA has a sensitivity and specificity of 98% or more,
but it has a low predictive value in populations with a very low rate of infection. IAL at 2.1.2-1
to 2.1.2-2. Because of the potential harm that results from reporting a false positive result,
positive tests must be verified by a confirmatory test, such as a Western Blot test, before report-
ing the result to the patient. Id at 2.1.2-1.
30. 21 C.F.R. § 610.45 (1992); AMERiCAN Ass'N OF BLOOD BANKS, STANDARDS FOR
BLOOD BANKS AND TRANSFUSION SERVICES § B5.500 (14th ed. 1991).
31. Wilber, supra note 5, at 2.1.2-1.
32. Id.
33. "Seroconversion" is a term used to describe the transformation of an infected individ-
ual's blood from negative to positive for the particular antibody being tested. DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 1510;
34. Gerberding & Sande, supra note 16, at 10.2.9-1.
35. Wilber, supra note 5, at 2.1.2-1.
36. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 24-25. AZT therapy is not without its
drawbacks. Aside from the extremely high cost, it produces side effects in some patients that
are severe enough to contraindicate continued therapy. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 802-
05 (1992). The most common of these side effects is anemia, but they may also include gastro-
intestinal disorders, anxiety or depression, respiratory symptoms and other effects. Id A fur-
ther complication is that over a period of time the virus appears to be able to develop some
resistance to AZT by a mechanism that is not yet entirely understood. FLANDERS & FLAN-
DERS, supra note 1, at 24; Gorman, supra note 6, at 33.
37. Although there are some promising new drugs under development, none of these is
anywhere near ready for clinical trials. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 24-27;
Gorman, supra note 6, at 31-32.
38. Gorman, supra note 6, at 31. The situation has been grimly summarized: "'It's clear
we're losing the battle. We have one class of drugs that slows AIDS down by two or three
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The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates cumulative adult
HIV infection worldwide at ten to twelve million cases in 1992, which
may grow to at least thirty million by the year 2000.19 The number of
full-blown AIDS cases in 1992 was nearly two million worldwide, with
over a quarter million of those in the United States.4 Figures released in
September 1992 show that AIDS is now the number one cause of death
in young adult males in several major U.S. cities, including Los Angeles
and San Francisco. 1 The AIDS mortality rate in this age group now
surpasses that for cancer, heart disease and homicide.42 Given these
grim statistics, it is reasonable to assume that hospitals and other health
care institutions will see increasing numbers of HIV-infected and AIDS
patients,43 especially in areas with large concentrations of high-risk
groups.,
B. Implementation of Universal Precautions
Faced with increasing numbers of AIDS patients, in 1987 the Cen-
ters for Disease Control (CDC) recommended that all hospitals adopt
"universal precautions' 45 as an infection control practice. Under such
procedures, blood and body fluids of all patients are presumed to be in-
fectious and are handled with appropriate care, using barrier precautions
if there is any chance of contact.' Studies have shown that when univer-
years, and then people go on and die."' Id (quoting Mark Harrington, member of Treatment
Action Group of New York City).
39. Id at 31, 33 (reporting World Health Organization (WHO) statistics in graph and
chart).
40. Id. at 33.
41. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Increased HIVIAIDS Mortality Among Residents
Aged 25-44 Years--Baltimore, Maryland, 1987-1989, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 708, 709 (1992).
42. Id
43. For example, in 1988 five percent of the hospital beds in New York City were already
being used by AIDS patients. D.S. Weinberg & H.W. Murray, Coping with AIDS The Special
Problems of New York City, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1469, 1471 (1987). One commentator has
speculated that 25% or more of the hospital beds in some urban areas will be occupied by
AIDS patients in the near future. Deborah J. Cotton, The Impact of AIDS on the Medical
Care System, 260 JAMA 519, 522-23 (1988).
44. The first cases of AIDS were confined almost exclusively to gay and bisexual men, but
soon spread among intravenous drug abusers. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 21-
22; Gorman, supra note 6, at 33. In 1992, these two groups comprised 81% of AIDS cases.
But the disease is spreading rapidly into the heterosexual population and is in fact increasing at
a faster rate among heterosexuals than homosexuals. Id. at 33-34.
45. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmis-
sion in Health-Care Settings, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Aug. 21, 1987, at 3S-
17S (Supp. 2S).
46. Id at 3S, 5S. These include wearing gloves, masks and face shields, as well as
handwashing between patient contacts. Id at 9S.
[Vol. 26:1251
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sal precautions are properly instituted as hospital policy and followed by
health care workers, they significantly reduce blood and body fluid
exposures.47
Accidental needlesticks, however, remain the single biggest threat to
health care worker safety.4" Although universal precautions have sub-
stantially reduced needlestick incidents, they have not eliminated all such
events.49 The fact remains that most exposures cannot be avoided. 0
The CDC's policies have served only as guidelines for hospitals to
follow, but the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
has recently promulgated a rigid set of mandatory standards designed to
reduce the transmission of bloodborne pathogens, such as the HIV and
hepatitis B viruses.5 These standards describe specific barrier precau-
tions and work practice controls52 that all employers whose employees
perform exposure-prone tasks must follow.53 Employers are required to
design and implement an "exposure control plan" that is accessible to all
employees.54 They also must implement annual training programs for
employees.55 Because these federal rules only became effective on March
6, 1992, it is too soon to tell what, if any, additional impact they will have
47. See Ruthanne Marcus et al., Surveillance of Health Care Workers Exposed to Blood
from Patients Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1118, 1119 (1988) (37% of reported occupational exposures reviewed were deemed preventable
by use of universal precautions); Edward S. Wong et al., Are Universal Precautions Effective in
Reducing the Number of Occupational Exposures Among Health Care Workers?, 265 JAMA
1123, 1123 (1991) (stating that exposures decreased nearly 50% among physicians who used
universal precautions when caring for patients).
48. One survey found that 10% of hospital personnel are involved annually in injuries
from sharp instruments, accounting for one-third of all work accidents. Billiet et al., supra
note 16, at 120. Safety shielded needles are now available for routine phlebotomy (blood draw-
ing) procedures; however, they are extremely expensive and not yet widely used. Id at 123.
Measured against the costs of following up on exposure incidents, the cost can be justified. Id
49. Kristin White, "Why Weren't You Just More Careful?'" What Does It Take to Avoid
Occupational Exposure to HIV?, AIDS PATIENT CARE, June 1990, at 13, (citing estimates that
universal precautions would have prevented 40% of 1500 needlesticks reported to CDC since
1983).
50. If 40% of needlesticks would have been prevented by universal precautions, simple
arithmetic leads to the conclusion that 60% were not preventable. See id
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1992).
52. "Work practice controls" are procedures that reduce the chance of exposure by alter-
img the manner in which a task is performed. For example, recapping needles by a two-handed
technique is now prohibited. Id § 1910.1030(b).
53. Id. § 1910.1030(c). See infra note 208 for a description of what constitutes an "expo-
sure-prone" task.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(c) (1992).
55. Id § 1910.1030(g)(2).
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on the current level of exposures in health facilities that already observe
universal precautions.
5 6
C. Social and Political Complications
1. Discrimination
A unique feature of the HIV epidemic is that it has affected stigma-
tized groups such as homosexuals, intravenous drug abusers and minori-
ties in disproportionate numbers.5 7 Prevalence of the disease in these
traditionally disfavored groups is cited as a major cause of the federal
government's slow response to the crisis and the low level of funding for
research in the crucial early stages of the epidemic.5 8 As the public be-
came aware of the disease, HIV-infected persons found themselves suffer-
ing not only from the ravages of the disease itself, but also from
unwarranted public fear and revulsion. 9
A study released in 1988 by the AIDS Institute of the Harvard
School of Public Health6 found that: (1) Most Americans believe the
AIDS epidemic has led to increased discrimination against HIV-positive
persons and those with active AIDS; (2) most Americans think that con-
trolling the spread of AIDS will necessarily require some loss of privacy
and civil rights; (3) a substantial minority of Americans perceive AIDS
as "deserved punishment for offensive or immoral behavior;"' 61 (4) a
smaller minority would refuse to work with an AIDS-infected person
and believe that employers have the right to fire such persons; (5) many
parents would not permit their children to attend school if a classmate
had AIDS; and (6) a substantial minority does not want individuals with
AIDS living nearby and would support landlords having the right to
56. Because they are mandatory, however, these rules should significantly lower the
number of exposure incidents in facilities that have a record of poor compliance with recom-
mended universal precautions. Some studies have concluded that "[h]ealthcare workers in
low-prevalence areas are less likely to follow universal precautions and are selectively moti-
vated to be more careful when caring for known HIV-positive patients. Adherence to univer-
sal precautions requires continuous educational efforts because compliance diminishes over
time." R.J. Zabransky, National AIDS Forum, 14 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY NEWSL. 129,
135-36 (1992) (reporting findings released at Fifth National Forum on AIDS, Hepatitis and
Other Blood-Borne Diseases, held in Atlanta, Georgia, March 29 through April 1, 1992).
57. Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflections on the
Nature of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REV. 909, 912 (1989).
58. See generally SHILTS, supra note I (relating early history of AIDS epidemic in United
States).
59. Dunlap, supra note 57, at 912-20.
60. Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Discrimination Against People with AIDS: The
Public's Perspective, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1022 (1988).
61. Id. at 1023.
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evict them.62 Although recent public education programs may have
made inroads toward changing some of these attitudes, these findings
show indisputably that persons suffering from HIV are in dire need of
legal protection against unwarranted discrimination.
Victims of such practices usually have been successful in using both
federal and state antidiscrimination laws to assert their rights.6" For ex-
ample, in School Board v. Arline,6 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197365 applies to persons with
contagious diseases.66 Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise quali-
fied individual with handicaps... shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in... or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 67 Arline addressed the issue of what constitutes "otherwise
qualified."68 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that" '[a]n
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all 'of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap,' "69 defined as being able to per-
form the "'essential functions of the job.' "70 If a person can no longer
perform those "essential functions," a court will consider whether the
employer could make "reasonable accommodations" to enable the handi-
capped person to perform those functions.71
The Supreme Court further stated that "[a] person who poses a sig-
nificant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the
workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk."'72 Trial courts must con-
sider four factors when determining whether there are health and safety
risks: (1) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted); (2) the
duration of the risk (how long the carrier is contagious); (3) the severity
of the risk (potential harm to third parties); and (4) the probability of
62. Id. at 1023-25.
63. See infra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
64. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
66. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
68. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
69. Id. at 287 n.17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406
(1979)).
70. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)) (codified without amendment at 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k) (1991)).
71. Id.
72. Id at 287 n.16. In Arline, the plaintiff was a school teacher with tuberculosis. Id at
276. The Court remanded the case for findings of fact as to whether the plaintiff's presence in
the classroom posed no risk to students. Id at 289.
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transmitting the disease and ensuing harm.73 Courts must base findings
related to these factors on "reasonable medical judgments given the state
of medical knowledge"'74 and should defer to the opinions of public
health officials.75
Using the Arline criteria, courts have specifically applied section 504
to persons infected with AIDS 6.7  For example, in Chalk v. United States
District Court,77 the Ninth Circuit decided that an HIV-infected teacher
could return to the classroom under section 504 because, as interpreted
in Arline, there was no "'significant risk of [transmitting the] disease to
others.' "78 Under current medical knowledge, this simply is not the case
with AIDS.
7 9
Notably, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act expressly applies only
to employers or agencies that receive federal funds.80 This limitation has
been corrected with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA),"1 which reaches private employers as well as state and local
governments. 2 Under the ADA, persons are considered disabled if they
are substantially limited in one or more "major life activities. '8 3 The
appendix to the ADA notes that HIV is one of several impairments
which are inherently substantially limiting.84 An employee may not be
removed from a position unless there is a "direct threat.., to the health
73. Id at 288 (citing Brief of American Medical Association as amicus curiae at 19).
74. Id (citing Brief of American Medical Association as amicus curiae at 19).
75. Id.
76. See Doe v. Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding plaintiff
wrongfully discharged from drug rehabilitation program because of HIV-positive status);
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding child
with AIDS "otherwise qualified" to attend school).
77. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. Id at 708 (quoting School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987)).
79. Id at 708-09 (describing previous cases concerning transmissibility of AIDS). The
court noted that in the future, the deterioration of Chalk's immune system may lead to his
being infected with an opportunistic disease, which itself could be communicable in a class-
room situation. Id at 711. The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to review the medi-
cal situation, should this occur, and to make a determination as to what reasonable procedures
school officials could take to ensure that no significant risk of harm would result from Chalk's
presence in the classroom. Id
80. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
81. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a general discussion of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, see S. TROWERS-CROWLEY, ADA PRIMER: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE AMERI-
cANs WITH DISABILITIES Acr OF 1990 (1990).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991); see id § 12111(5)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
83. Id § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1992).
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and safety of others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
accommodation." 5
State statutes may fill the gap if federal statutes have failed or have
been interpreted unfavorably for HIV-infected plaintiffs. Such has been
the case in California. For example, in Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment
& Housing Commission,86 an employee with AIDS, John Chadbourne,
was discharged from his position at Raytheon because of his HIV sta-
tus.87 Raytheon was concerned that he could transmit the disease to his
co-workers, 88 although his position involved primarily clerical duties.89
Chadbourne filed complaints with both the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Program (OFCCP) of the U.S. Department of Labor and the
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the Commis-
sion).9" The OFCCP found that Raytheon was subject to the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 because Raytheon was a government contractor,91 but
the OFCCP failed to find evidence of discrimination. 92 Chadbourne was
thus denied relief under the Federal Rehabilitation Act;93 however, the
outcome was more favorable to him in California.94 The Commission
found that "Raytheon had deprived Chadbourne of his fundamental civil
right to be free of employment discrimination based upon a physical
handicap."9" The California Court of Appeal upheld the Commission's
findings and award of relief.96
The Raytheon decision was based on a prior California Supreme
Court case, American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment &
Housing Commission,97 which interpreted the California Fair Employ-
85. Id § 1630.2(r) (1992) (emphasis added). The section of the ADA that directly ad-
dresses communicable diseases applies only to individuals employed in food-handling posi-
tions. Id § 1630.16(e). Employers may not act against food-handling employees with an
infectious or communicable disease unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services has
recognized an actual danger. Id On May 16, 1991, the Public Health Service issued a list of
the diseases and symptoms for which an employee may be removed from a food-handling
position. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,726 (1991). Notably, HIV was not on the list. See id
86. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1989).
87. Id at 1247, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
88. Id.
89. Id at 1245, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
90. Id at 1247, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
91. Id
92. Id at 1247-48, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
93. Id. at 1248, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id. at 1252-53, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Unfortunately, Chadbourne had died by the
time the Commission ruled on his claim. The relief was awarded to Chadbourne's estate,
which became a party to the litigation after his death. Id at 1248, 261 Cal. Rptr at 200.
97. 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982).
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ment and Housing Act's provisions prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion against persons with physical handicaps. 98 The American National
court held that "[tihe law clearly was designed to prevent employers
from acting arbitrarily against physical condition[s] that, whether actu-
ally or potentially handicapping, may present no current job disability or
job-related health risk." 99
A 1989 survey of state antidiscrimination laws as applied specifically
to AIDS revealed that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
statutes similar to the Rehabilitation Act that prohibit discrimination
against individuals with handicaps. 100 Most state laws also reach private
as well as public employers. 101 Some, including California, have also
passed AIDS-specific statutes directly targeting areas such as housing,
insurance and employment."0 2
2. Consent and confidentiality
While antidiscrimination laws are helpful to protect the rights of
HIV-infected persons, the cornerstone of public health policy regarding
AIDS testing has been consent and confidentiality requirements. 03 The
discriminatory practices and social stigmatization that often result from
the disclosure of positive test results make confidentiality an essential fac-
tor in encouraging voluntary testing.l°4 Health authorities have long rec-
ognized that people who should be tested, such as those in high-risk
groups, are much more likely to come forward voluntarily if they know
the results of the tests will be completely confidential.10 5 The individual
states have been responsible for legislation in this area under their police
power over health and safety concerns.
10 6
California has some of the most protective laws in the nation.
10 7
Section 199.22(a) of California's Health and Safety Code provides that all
persons to be tested for HIV must give written consent;10 8 the statute
98. CAL Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 1993).
99. American Nat'l, 32 Cal. 3d at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (emphasis
added).
100. Gostin, supra note 9, at 1628.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1628, 1630 nn.147-49.
103. See infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
104. Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Ana-
lytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. Rnv. 871, 883-86 (1989).
105. Id
106. See 8 BERNARD E. WmTKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law
§§ 784-786 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing nature of state's police power).
107. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22(a) (West 1990).
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mandates severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure of the results."
Physicians are permitted, but not required to warn persons believed to be
the sexual partners or needle-sharing partners of a patient who tests posi-
tive for HIV,110 but the test results must first be discussed with the pa-
tient and "appropriate educational and psychological counseling"
offered."' If a physician discloses positive results to a third party, the
physician may not provide any information that identifies the person who
has been tested. 1 2 Neither a patient nor a physician can be compelled to
disclose an HIV test result. 13 Even blood donors who test positive are
shielded from identification if litigation results from the transfusion of
HIV-contaminated blood.
14
The California Constitution is an additional source of privacy
rights. 15 Unlike the United States Constitution," 6 the California Con-
109. Id. § 199.21. Subsection (a) provides that negligent disclosure to:
any third party, in a manner which identifies or provides identifying characteristics
of the person to whom the test results apply, except pursuant to a written authoriza-
tion... shall be assessed a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed... [$1000] plus
court costs... paid to the subject of the test.
Id. § 199.21(a). Subsection (b) states that willful disclosure shall result in a $5000 penalty. Id.
§ 199.21(b). Subsection (c) establishes criminal penalties for negligent or willful disclosure if
"economic, bodily, or psychological harm" is inflicted on the person tested. Id. § 199.21(c).
Such disclosure constitutes a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison or a
$10,000 fine, or both. Id.
110. Id. § 199.25(c). This section may effectively remove the physician's affirmative duty to
warn, which was established in the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), at least as applied to HIV. In Tarasoff,
the California Supreme Court held a psychiatrist liable in tort for failing to warn a murder
victim of his patient's homicidal delusions. Id at 433-44, 551 P.2d at 342-49, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 22-29. The court held that when a medical practitioner learns that his or her patient poses a
danger to a third party, the practitioner has an obligation to use reasonable care to protect that
third party, even though doing so may breach the traditional doctor-patient trust relationship.
Id at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(b) (West 1990).
112. Id § 199.25(a).
113. Id. § 199.20.
114. All donated blood is to be screened for HIV. Those yielding a positive result are
placed on a confidential state donor register.. Id §§ 1603.1-.2. In Irwin Memorial Blood Bank
v. Superior Court, the plaintiffs filed a negligence lawsuit against a blood bank for supplying
AIDS-infected blood to a heart transplant patient. 229 Cal. App. 3d 151, 153, 279 Cal. Rptr.
911, 912 (1991). The plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the names and addresses of
implicated donors during discovery. Id The trial court was willing to allow deposition of the
suspect donors behind a privacy screen. Id at 155, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 913. The California
Court of Appeal, however, found this to violate § 199.20 of the Health and Safety Code be-
cause it was inevitable that the donor would be seen and heard by at least the reporter and the
court-appointed referee. Id. at 157, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 914. The court stated that even "[t]he
appearance and the voice of a person are obviously identifying characteristics." Id
115. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
116. The issue of whether the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right of privacy is still open to
interpretation because there is no explicit clause enumerating such a right. See generally
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stitution explicitly guarantees citizens the right to privacy.117 Courts
have interpreted this right as protecting against invasions of privacy by
private citizens as well as by the state.11 For example, in Urbaniak v.
Newton,119 the plaintiff brought a suit for damages1 20 after undergoing a
neurological examination pursuant to a worker's compensation claim
against his former employer. 121 In the course of the test, electrodes with
sharp protrusions were placed on his head, which drew a small amount
of blood (as is common with this procedure).1 22 The patient cautioned
the nurse in attendance to take extra care to sterilize the equipment
before using it on another patient because he was HIV positive and did
not wish that anyone else be inadvertently exposed. 123  The nurse, in
turn, notified the doctor who informed the insurance company handling
the worker's compensation claim.12 4 The court found no violation of the
AIDS-specific confidentiality statute125 because the disclosure was not
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
line of U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with privacy issue). The holdings in early cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating law that banned use of contra-
ceptives by married couples as violative of "penumbra" or zone of privacy) and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that choice to terminate pregnancy is right of privacy under
"liberty" guarantee of Fourteenth Amendment) seem to validate an implied constitutional
right to privacy.
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized two distinct
privacy interests: (1) an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information, and (2) an
interest in the freedom to make personal decisions without government interference. Id. at
598-99. This dispute involved a New York statute that required doctors to submit reports,
containing the names and addresses of all patients who were receiving certain prescription
drugs, to a centralized computer network. Id. at 591. A unanimous Court found that the
government interest in obtaining the information outweighed the individuals' privacy interest
in preventing the state from gathering medical information about their drug usage. Id. at 600.
The Court did not reach the issue of whether there was any "unwarranted disclosure of accu-
mulated private data-whether intentional or unintentional-or by a system that did not con-
tain [adequate] security provisions." Id. at 605-06.
117. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and pri-
vacy." Id (emphasis added).
118. See, eg., Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal. App. 3d 230, 242,
256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (1989).
119. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1991).
120. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1133,
277 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The plaintiff appealed, but died before the case was decided; his estate
was substituted as the appellant. Ia
121. Id. at 1133-34, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
122. Id. at 1134, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id at 1142-43, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21
(West 1990) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West Supp.
1993))).
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made pursuant to the performance of an HIV test.126 However, the court
held that the plaintiff had a cause of action under the privacy provisions
of the California Constitution. 
12 7
The California Legislature has adopted exceptions to the consent
provisions in the Health and Safety Code since the original legislation
went into effect. In response to concerns about the possible spread of
AIDS within prison populations, prisoners may be screened for HIV
without their consent.12 Courts may require convicted prostitutes to un-
dergo HIV testing,129 and victims of sexual crimes may request a court to
order HIV testing of the alleged offender.
130
3. Occupational exposure
The only California law to directly address occupational exposure to
potentially infective blood or body fluids is Proposition 96.131 Under the
California Constitution, citizens may introduce statutes or proposed
amendments to the Constitution by submitting a petition to the Secretary
of State that sets forth the proposed text of the law and that is signed by
the requisite number of registered voters. 132 Before introducing Proposi-
tion 96, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, along with State
Senator Ed Davis, promoted passage of Senate bill 1158, which would
have permitted testing of persons formally charged with sexual assault
for sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS.1 33 Under this bill, the
victim of the assault would have been informed of the results of the
test. 134 The bill died in committee in 1987 because opponents could not
agree to the provision for AIDS testing. 135  Sheriff Block introduced
Proposition 96 in response to the defeat of Senate bill 1158.136 California
voters passed it in November 1988.131
126. Id
127. Id at 1140-41, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7501 (West Supp. 1993).
129. Id. § 1202.6.
130. Id. § 1202.1. Test results may not be used as evidence against the defendant to obtain
a conviction because of the high degree of prejudice that may result. Id.
131. Proposition 96, 1988 Cal. Stat. A-271 to -274 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 199.95-.99 (West 1990)).
132. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. The signatures "must [be] equal in number to 5 percent in
the ease of a statute... of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial
election." Id. § 8(b).
133. Kelly A. Bennett, Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Slow Death of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1413, 1419 n.53 (1989).
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1413.
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The stated purpose of Proposition 96 is to:
require that information that may be vital to the health and
safety of the public.., be obtained and disclosed in an appro-
priate manner in order that precautions can be taken to pre-
serve their health and the health of others or that such persons
can be relieved from groundless fear of infection.
138
In addition to the provisions allowing testing of sexual offenders, 139
which would have been included in Senate bill 1158, Proposition 96 also
addressed law enforcement's concerns with occupational exposure to
AIDS. Proposition 96 allows peace officers, firefighters and emergency
rescue personnel' 4 to petition the court to require HIV testing if the
defendant is charged with interfering with official duties by "biting,
scratching, spitting, or transferring blood or other bodily fluids on, upon,
or through the skin or membranes." 141 Personnel employed in any state
facility in which adults or minors are incarcerated who learn of an in-
mate's HIV-positive status (or potential infectivity to others because of
an exposure) are required to report this knowledge to supervisory person-
nel.142 Supervisors can then take appropriate steps to protect both em-
ployees and other inmates from contact with blood and body fluids. 143
Proposition 96 also contains provisions to protect the tested individ-
ual's privacy rights. These protective measures mandate that "the court
shall order all persons, other than the test subject, who receive test re-
sults.., to maintain the confidentiality of personal identifying data relat-
ing to the test results except for disclosure which may be necessary to
obtain medical or psychological care or advice." 14 In addition, the test
results are for health and safety purposes only and cannot be used as
evidence in any criminal or juvenile proceeding.145
138. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West 1990).
139. Id § 199.96. Section 199.96 allows HIV testing of defendants charged with violations
of California Penal Code §§ 261 (rape), 261.5 (statutory rape), 262 (rape of a spouse), 266b
(abduction to live in illicit relationship), 266c (rape with foreign object), 286 (sodomy), 288
(lewd and lascivious acts with minor under age 14), and 288a (oral copulation). CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 261, 261.5, 262, 266b, 266c, 286, 288, 288a (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990).
141. Id
142. Id § 199.99(a).
143. Id § 199.99(c).
144. Id § 199.98(e).
145. Id. § 199.98(f).
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III. ANALYSIS: WHY OCCUPATIONAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO
PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO
HEALTH CARE WORKERS
A. The Health Care Professional and the Duty to Provide Care
The AIDS crisis has reached epidemic proportions worldwide.'"
As a result, contemporary health care providers find themselves caught
between the ethical and legal obligation to provide care to the victims of
this modern plague and an understandable concern for personal safety.' 47
Surprisingly, the early history of physician care during times of epi-
demic is one of economics, not virtue.14 During the plague outbreaks in
Europe between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, doctors often
fled the infested urban areas along with their healthiest patients. 49 As a
public policy matter, cities were forced to negotiate contractual arrange-
ments with physicians who were willing to stay behind to care for plague
victims.150
Although a variety of ethical canons and treatises existed on the
subject,
ethical consciousness was less effective a motive for action than
economic interest or, more broadly, fear of loss of status. Thus
the author of a sixteenth century treatise on professional ethics
said that "to avoid infamy [I] dared not absent myself but with
continual fear preserved myself as best I could."''
The concept of designating "plague doctors" endures today,
although they are generally not referred to in such terms.' 2 During the
twentieth century, the medical problems of the sick and impoverished
became institutionalized through vestiture in government agencies, with
public and private hospitals staffed by medical school faculty and in-
terns.'5 Although it is possible to censure physicians when they balk at
providing care to AIDS patients,15 4 the primary incentive to treat AIDS
patients is an economic one. Those doctors who treat AIDS patients are
146. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 48-50; infra note 321 and accompanying text.
148. Daniel M. Fox, The Politics of Physicians' Responsibility in Epidemics: A Note on His-
tory, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 5.
149. Id
150. Id. at 6-7.
151. Id. at 7 (quoting Darrel W. Amundsen, Medical Deontology and Pestilential Disease in
the Late Middle Ages, 32 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 403, 411 (1977) (alteration in
original)).
152. Id. at 8-9.
153. Id at 8.
154. Id at 9.
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more likely to be offered rewards such as funding for research and in-
creased academic standing."' 5
The prevalence of this voluntary contract theory of medical ethics
among bioethicists has "reinforced the notion that physicians, as free
moral agents, have a perfect right to choose whomever they wish to
serve. This claim to contractual freedom... fails to address the question
of whether physicians have a special duty to enter into contracts with
hazardous patients."156 Modem physicians had not been forced to deal
with this issue until the advent of AIDS. Thirty years ago, one entered
the profession with the knowledge that there were inherent risks; these
were accepted as part of the definition of being a physician.15 7 However,
sterilization techniques and the development of modem antibiotics even-
tually reduced contemporary health care providers' concerns about per-
sonal safety.158 AIDS has broken the spell.15 9 When most of today's
practitioners entered the profession, the possibility of contracting a fatal
illness from a patient was not part of the bargain. 160 The modem health
care worker is now forced to consider the moral conflict between per-
sonal risk and duty.
1 61
No matter where an individual physician might voluntarily draw the
line, 62 the American Medical Association (AMA) has directly addressed
155. Id.
156. John D. Arras, The Fragile Web of Responsibility: AIDS and the Duty to Treat, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 10, 11.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. A disturbing poll in the medical journal Cardiovascular News regarding a cardiovascu-
lar surgeon's public announcement that he would no longer treat HIV-infected patients illus-
trates that the line may not always be drawn in favor of a duty to provide care. Id. at 18
(citing Surgeon Won't Operate on Victims of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1987, at A21).
Ninety-one percent of the physicians who responded to the survey agreed with the surgeon's
decision. Id. (citing Surgeon Won't Operate on Victims of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1987,
at A21). Notwithstanding the low response rate of 1.5%, this may indicate a lack of willing-
ness by most physicians to subject themselves to the risks of caring for AIDS patients. Id.
(citing Surgeon Won't Operate on Victims of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1987, at A21).
Physicians also harbor basic societal prejudices that affect their voluntary behavior. One
Illinois family practitioner stated: "'I would not knowingly treat a homosexual patient with
AIDS, but I would treat patients who got the disease by blood transfusion, and I would treat
children with AIDS."' Id. at 20 n.35 (quoting What Doctors Think About AIDS, MD, Jan.
1987, at 95).
However, these attitudes may be slowly changing in favor of providing care to AIDS
patients. A more recent survey found that 72% of surgeons polled would operate if an HIV-
infected patient were referred for needed surgery that the surgeon was capable of performing.
Gene A. Shelley & Richard J. Howard, A National Survey of Surgeons'Attitudes About Pa-
1268
June 1993] NONCONSENSUAL HIV TESTING 1269
this conflict. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA
(CEJA) has mandated that:
A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose
condition is within the physician's realm of competence solely
because the patient is [HV] seropositive. The tradition of the
American Medical Association, since its organization in 1847,
is that: "when an epidemic prevails, a physician must continue
his labors without regard to the risk of his own health."' 63
Likewise, the American Nurses' Association (ANA) has published a
position paper dealing with the issue of responsibility to provide care in
the face of personal risk.164 The ANA paper delineates four criteria for
nurses to consider when deciding whether there is a moral duty or a
moral option to care for patients with communicable or infectious dis-
eases. 165 These are:
1. The patient is at significant risk of harm, loss or dam-
age if the nurse does not assist.
2. The nurse's intervention or care is directly relevant to
preventing harm.
tients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome, 127 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 206, 208 (1992).
163. D. Anthony Forrester, Aids: The Responsibility to Care, 34 VILL. L. REv. 799, 808-09
(1989) (quoting COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N,
ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GROWING AIDS CRISIS (1988)). This mandate seems to
conflict with the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which provides that "except in emergen-
cies, [physicians are] free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environ-
ment in which to provide medical services." Id. at 809 (quoting COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION at ix (1986)).
This freedom to decide how to conduct a practice, however, must not be used as a smokescreen
to disguise "illegal or invidious discrimination." Id.; see also Benjamin Freedman, Health
Professions, Codes, and the Right to Refuse to Treat HIV-Infected Patients, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 20, 24 (describing how medical codes of ethics are interpreted with
regard to treating AIDS patients).
Medical authorities have construed the foregoing principles to mean that physicians must
provide care to AIDS patients if they feel competent to do so. Id. If they do not, they may
refer, but may not abandon these patients. Id. (citing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GROWING AIDS
CRISIS (1987)).
164. Forrester, supra note 163, at 806 (citing AMERICAN NURSES' ASS'N COMM. ON ETH-
ICS, AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSI-
BILITY IN PROVIDING NURSING CARE, in ETHICS IN NURSING: POSITION STATEMENTS AND
GUIDELINES 6, 6-7 (1988)).
165. Id. at 806-07 (citing AMERICAN NURSES' ASS'N COMM. ON ETHICS, AMERICAN
NURSES' ASSOCIATION STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN PROVID-
ING NURSING CARE, in ETHICS IN NURSING: POSITION STATEMENTS AND GUIDELINES 6,6-
7 (1988)).
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3. The nurse's care will probably prevent harm, loss, or
damage to the patient.
4. The benefit the patient will receive outweighs any per-
sonal harm the nurse might incur and does not present more
than minimal risk to the health care provider.
166
If all these criteria are met, the nurse is obligated to provide care; if only
one is not met the nurse may exercise a moral option to do So.167 In most
situations, caring for AIDS patients meets all four criteria because of the
low risk of harm to the nurse;168 thus nurses have an obligation to pro-
vide care.
169
Regardless of whether health care providers have an ethical duty to
treat AIDS patients, they definitely have a legal duty to do so. 170 Both
the common law171 and recent statutory enactments 17 2 require health
care providers to respond to the needs of any patient in an emergency.
Under the ADA, places of "public accommodation" may not discrimi-
nate against persons with AIDS.173 The ADA lists a variety of establish-
ments that are considered to be public accommodations, including but
166. Id. at 807 (citing AMERICAN NURSES' ASS'N COMM. ON ETHICS, AMERICAN NURSES'
ASSOCIATION STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN PROVIDING NURS-
ING CARE, in ETHICS IN NURSING: POSITION STATEMENTS AND GUIDELINES 6,6-7 (1988)).
167. Id (citing AMERICAN NURSES' ASS'N COMM. ON ETHICS, AMERICAN NURSES' ASSO-
CIATION STATEMENT REGARDING RISK VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN PROVIDING NURSING
CARE, in ETHICS IN NURSING: POSITION STATEMENTS AND GUIDELINES 6, 6-7 (1988)).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. An employee can refuse to work for safety reasons under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); see 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1992). One of the pur-
poses of this statute is to "provid[e] medical criteria which will assure insofar as practicable
that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a
result of his work experience." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(7). For a discussion of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) guidelines specific to AIDS in the health care envi-
ronment, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030
(detailing OSHA policy on preventing occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens). How-
ever, an employee may only refuse to work if there is no reasonable alternative because the
employer has not corrected the dangerous condition after receiving notification. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1977.12(b). The dangerous condition must also be so threatening that a reasonable person
would conclude that there was no time to compel corrective action through normal enforce-
ment procedures. Id
171. George J. Annas, Legal Risks and Responsibilities of Physicians in the AIDS Epidemic,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 26, 26-27.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. III 1991). Commonly known as COBRA, this statute
particularly addresses the evil of "patient dumping"-the practice of denying care to less desir-
able patients, such as the uninsured or those with AIDS-when these patients come to a medi-
cal facility with an emergency medical condition. Id A similar provision has been enacted by
the state of California. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2 (West 1990).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. III 1991); see also TROWERS-CROWLEY, supra note 81, at
12 (describing ADA regulations for places of public accommodation).
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not limited to "professional offices [ ]of ... health care providers and
others[ ] and hospitals."174
B. Balancing the Burdens: Do Patients Have Duties?
An established obligation to provide care on the part of health care
workers raises the question of whether the patient owes a reciprocal duty,
especially if there is a health and safety issue at stake. When a health
care worker in California is occupationally exposed to the blood or body
fluids of a patient of unknown HIV status, there is no legal way to com-
pel that patient to undergo testing. 175 The risk of potential infection
with a lethal disease is a heavy burden for health care providers to carry.
Precedent, however, supports the notion that persons with conta-
gious diseases have duties to those whom they might infect. California
courts have previously established, on strong public policy grounds, that
a person who has a sexually transmissible disease has a duty to disclose
the condition to sex partners. 176 Thus, a person who, through either neg-
ligence or deceit, transmits the disease to another may be liable in tort for
damages.1 77 Furthermore, an infected person is not relieved of this duty
even if he or she believes that the disease cannot be transmitted.1 78 The
courts also have held that the constitutional right of privacy does not
absolve an individual from this duty. 179 "The right of privacy is not ab-
174. TROWERS-CROWLEY, supra note 81, at 12.
175. See BioETHIcs COMM. OF THE L.A. COUNTY BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION FOR
STUDY REGARDING EXPOSURES OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS TO THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS (1991) [hereinafter BioETHics COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS] (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Several other states have allowed for this contin-
gency. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(c)(4) (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 19203-C (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.107
(West 1992). For example, Illinois has dispensed with the written informed consent require-
ment for HIV testing when either a public safety officer or health care provider has been
exposed. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7307 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). Florida requires
an effort to obtain consent; if consent is not obtained, the test may be performed on a previ-
ously voluntarily obtained specimen, and the patient is to be notified that the test will be
performed. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004 (West Supp. 1993).
176. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77
(1984) (holding that plaintiff had cause of action for negligence and fraud because defendant
had lied about having herpes).
177. Id.
178. Doe v. Roe, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1538, 1543-44, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566-67 (1990). In
this case, the defendant, who knew he had genital herpes but was asymptomatic, engaged in a
sexual relationship with the plaintiff, who eventually contracted the disease from him. Id. at
1541-42, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65. The court found the man negligent because he had made
no effort to obtain information from his doctor as to whether asymptomatic herpes was trans-
missible. Id. at 1544-45, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
179. Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
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solute, and in some cases is subordinate to the state's fundamental right
to enact laws which promote public health, welfare, and safety, even
though such laws may invade the offender's right of privacy."18
Because a person with a sexually transmitted nonfatal disease, such
as herpes, has a duty-to disclose this information to sex partners, 181 it is
reasonable to impose a similar obligation on a patient to disclose his or
her HIV status (or, if unknown, to consent to testing) when a potentially
fatal exposure is at issue. Imposing such a duty would have the effect of
more equitably distributing the legal burdens between patient and health
care worker.
In 1993, a jury in the Los Angeles Superior Court decided a case
that specifically raised the issue of patient duties in the context of AIDS,
at least in cases in which the patient already knows his or her HIV status.
In Boulais v. Lustig,82 a surgical technician sued a patient for fraudu-
lently concealing the fact that she was HIV-positive from the surgical
team that performed cosmetic surgery on her.183 The patient gave false
information on a medical history form-stating that she was not cur-
rently under treatment for any illnesses, when in fact she had been diag-
nosed with AIDS in 1987 and was under a physician's care for the
disease.1 84 During the course of the operation, the technician's hand was
lacerated with a scalpel, thereby exposing the technician to the patient's
infected blood.1 85 The-jury found that the patient had a duty to inform
the surgical team of her. HIV-positive status. 186 According to one juror,
"[tihere was a message we wanted to send to people that you can't do
what this defendant did: misrepresenting her health status so that some-
body else's life was endangered. That just cannot be tolerated." '187
Similarly, a New York court recently took the position that HIV-
positive patients have a legal duty to inform health care workers of their
infection,' 88 even though New York, like California, has protective
180. Id. (citing Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 380, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430
(1983)).
181. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
182. No. BC 038105 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 23, 1991).
183. Penelope McMillan, Jury Rules Against AIDS Patient, L.A. TiMs, Feb. 10, 1993, at
B1, B8. The defendant plans to appeal the verdict. Id. at B1; see also Lauren Blau, Medical
Worker Wins Suit Against Patient with AIDS, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 10, 1993, at 1, 9 (describing
outcome and legal implications of case).
184. Blan, supra note 183, at 1.
185. Id.
186. See id at 9; McMillan, supra note 183, at B8.
187. McMillan, supra note 183, at B8.
188. Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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AIDS statutes.18 9 In Doe v. Roe, 19° the plaintiff brought an action
against his doctor for the doctor's release of confidential HIV informa-
tion. 191 Although the court found that the doctor breached the duty of
confidentiality, 92 it also concluded that New York law did not negate
the plaintiff's legal duty to disclose his HIV-positive status to the doc-
tor. 1 93 The court stated that whether such a duty exists depends on
whether the doctor's interests are also entitled to protection.'94 While
the New York confidentiality statute in question is undoubtedly intended
to provide protection to those afflicted with HIV, it does not insulate
such persons from responsibility for transmission of the disease through
negligence or fraud.1 95 The court reasoned that:
Such a legal duty arises out of not only moral and ethical con-
siderations, but out of logic, common sense and medical evi-
dence as well, with regard to the general health of society and
its physician caretakers. To hold otherwise would be to im-
providently elevate policy and political aspects of this fatal dis-
ease over the medically proven health dangers of exposure to
HIV infected blood, semen, saliva, etc., and to demonstrated
risks of transmission to unknowing and unprepared recip-
ients.196
Health care professionals clearly have an ethical and legal obligation
to provide care to AIDS and HIV-infected patients. This duty makes it
impossible to completely avoid the risk of contact with infected blood or
body fluids, even if universal precautions are rigorously followed. 197 To
balance this legal burden, some courts have recently determined that pa-
tients also have a duty to inform health care providers of their HIV sta-
tus, if known. A logical extension of this duty is to require that a patient
be tested when his or her HIV status is unknown and a health care
worker has suffered an exposure.
189. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (describing consent re-
quirements for HIV testing); id § 2782 (relating to confidentiality and disclosure of HIV-
related information); id § 2785 (describing circumstances under which court may order dis-
closure of HIV-related information).
190. 588 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
191. Id. at 239.
192. Id at 246-47.
193. Id at 241-42; see also John Horty, Court Rules Patient Has Legal Duty to Reveal HIV
Status, PATIENT CARE L., reprinted in OR MANAGER, Nov. 1992, at 18 (describing outcome
and legal implications of case).
194. Doe, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42.
195. Id at 242.
196. Id
197. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text; infra note 321.
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C. Repercussions from the Florida Dentist Case
Medical professionals have long regarded the potential for exposure
to HIV as a serious occupational safety issue.198 The general public,
however, was not as concerned with the reality of HIV transmission in
the health care setting until it was discovered that patients may also be at
risk.
In July 1990, the CDC reported that a patient of a dentist known to
have died of AIDS had become infected.1 99 The patient, later identified
as Kimberly Bergalis, became an active voice in the movement to require
HIV testing of health care workers.2 °' Ms. Bergalis was presumably in-
fected when she underwent an invasive dental procedure, 0 1 although
this has not been conclusively proven.20 2 Before her death from AIDS in
1991, Ms. Bergalis, who was twenty-three, testified before Congress,
pleading for passage of legislation requiring mandatory testing of patients
and health care workers. 2 3 Her testimony produced a flurry of media
attention, which in turn has generated a great deal of public discussion
about mass HIV testing.2°4 The focus of the debate, however, has been
on the need to screen health care workers, not patients.205
Because it now seems at 16ast possible that the virus can be transmit-
ted to patients by infected caregivers, the CDC has promulgated a new
set of guidelines designed to prevent transmission of HIV to patients in
the health care setting.20 6 The CDC recommends: (1) adherence to uni-
198. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
199. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Possible Transmission of Human Irmmunodeficiency
Virus to a Patient During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 489, 489 (1990) [hereinafter CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Invasive Dental Proce-
dure]. Four other patients of this dentist also became HIV positive, but other risk factors were
identified for at least two of these patients. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Trans-
mission of HIVDuring an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. RP. 21, 21-22 (1991).
200. See Mike Clary, AIDS Victim Infected by Dentist Dies, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at
A4.
201. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Invasive Dental Procedure, supra note 199, at
489-91. CDC investigators concluded that the dental procedure was responsible for infecting
Ms. Bergalis because it could identify no other risk factors for this patient. Id. at 489-90.
202. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Investigations of Patients Who Have Been
Treated by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
344, 344-45 (1992).
203. See Clary, supra note 200, at A4.
204. E.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, Cauldron of Anger, LIFE, Jan. 1992, at 61, 63.
205. See id.; see also A Death Not in Vain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at B6 (editorial)
(describing aftermath of Kimberly Bergalis' testimony before Congress).
206. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone In-
vasive Procedures, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 12, 1991, at 1, 1-6. But see
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versal precautions; (2) identification of exposure-prone procedures; (3)
health care workers who perform these procedures should know their
HIV and HBV (hepatitis B virus) status; (4) health care workers who are
infected with either HIV or HBV should seek assistance from an expert
review panel to determine under what, if any, circumstances they may
continue to perform exposure-prone procedures; and (5) patients should
be notified before undergoing these procedures when performed by in-
fected health care workers.2 "7 However, these guidelines also state that
there is no basis for restricting the practice of HIV- or HBV-infected
health care workers who perform noninvasive procedures or procedures
that are invasive but not exposure prone.20 8
Shortly after the CDC published these guidelines, Congress passed a
compromise bill that required states to adopt these guidelines (or a state
equivalent) or risk losing federal Public Health Service funds.2 1 This
legislation stops short of mandating testing of health care workers, but it
may create liability for those who do not comply.210 Thus, it has the
effect of requiring health care workers who perform invasive procedures
to be tested for HIV and, if positive, to disclose this fact to the patient.211
The lopsided allocation of legal burdens is further imbalanced because
Study Finds No HIV Transmitted from Doctors to Patients, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 14, 1993,
at 8 (reporting study which found no HIV seroconversion among approximately 2500 patients
who had undergone invasive medical procedures performed by HIV-infected physicians).
207. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 206, at 5.
208. Id. Exposure-prone procedures:
include digital palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence
of the [health care worker's] fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object
in a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic site. Performance of exposure-
prone procedures presents a recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the [health
care worker], and-if such an injury occurs-the [worker's] blood is likely to contact
the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/or mucous membranes.
Id. at 4.
209. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Supp. III 1991)).
210. See id
211. The Office of Technology Assessment, in a background paper, endorsed the creation of
safe harbors against liability for infected health care workers who do not perform invasive
procedures; it also favors safe harbors for those who perform invasive procedures that are not
exposure-prone, provided the standard of proof allows for the possibility of recovery of dam-
ages for infection resulting from gross negligence. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, HIV IN THE HEALTH CARE WORKPLACE: A BACKGROUND PAPER (1991), reprinted
in 6 AIDS PATIENT CARE 169, 182 (1992).
Notably, several jurisdictions had approved measures similar to the requirements of the
new federal law before it was enacted. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that HIV-infected physician was required to obtain informed
consent from patients before performing surgeries); In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595
A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal granted, 611 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1992) (holding that HIV-
infected resident physician required to disclose HIV status to certain patients before perform-
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under this bill, as well as under California statutes, patients are not recip-
rocally required to reveal HIV-related information to the health care
provider.
2 12
D. Other Considerations
The perception by health care workers that the legal system forces
them to carry an inequitable share of the burden may undesirably en-
courage surreptitious HIV testing. Hospital patients are frequently sub-
jected to having blood drawn for a variety of testing purposes; it is a
simple matter to divert some of the legitimately obtained specimen for
an HIV test.213 This practice of "civil disobedience" is rationalized as a
matter of fairness and necessity.
214
However, if the result of the surreptitious testing is positive, it leaves
the health care worker who engineered it in a difficult ethical situation.
First, if the patient has not consented and is informed of the positive
result, the trust relationship between the patient and caregiver is de-
stroyed.215 Second, because of the emotional trauma that such news is
likely to cause, adequate counseling is absolutely essential but may not be
provided if the testing was conducted outside procedural channels.216 Fi-
nally, if the health care provider keeps the results from the patient to
avoid civil or criminal penalties that may ensue, the health care provider
must decide whether to warn others who may come in contact with the
HIV-infected patient, if that contact may result in transmission of the
disease.2 17 Further, the patient will be denied the opportunity to obtain
early treatment, which could prolong life.218
ing surgery or obstetrical care). See infra notes 301-13 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989).
212. Depending on the outcome of the anticipated appeal in Boulais v. Lustig, No. BC
038105 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 23, 1991), this may no longer be true in California, at least
if the patient already knows his or her HIV status. Boulais did not deal with the issue of
whether the patient must submit to testing if there has been an exposure and his or her HIV
status is unknown. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. This was also the situation
in the New York case of Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. 1992). See supra notes 188-
96 and accompanying text.
213. This can be unofficially accomplished through interdepartmental cooperation (the lab-
oratory performing the test is willing to overlook the written consent requirement if a health
care worker is involved). Because the results are never charted, they do not officially exist,
thus circumventing the consent requirement.
214. Furrow, supra note 11, at 826-27.
215. Id. at 853.
216. See FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 33; Furrow, supra note 11, at 830.
217. Furrow, supra note 11, at 853.
218. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 24; see infra note 224.
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A Another difficult situation emerges when an exposed health care
worker wishes to obtain proper consent to test from the patient, but that
patient is incompetent to give consent and is without a conservator.
Under the California Probate Code, the court may order medical testing,
but only for the benefit of the patient, not a third party.2 19 This signifi-
cant gap in the law reinforces the belief among health care workers that
they bear the burdens of California AIDS legislation.
It is ironic that shortly after Kimberly Bergalis testified before Con-
gress amidst a barrage of media attention, Joann Ruiz, a Sacramento
nurse, became the first occupationally infected health care worker to die
from AIDS.220 Ms. Ruiz dedicated her last months to providing home
care for AIDS patients, including the one who had infected her,2 2 ' yet
her sacrifice received little attention.
Occupational exposure to HIV is a constant risk in the course of
caring for patients; although universal precautions have helped reduce
exposures, they cannot totally eliminate them. Proposition 96 took the
first step by recognizing that for public safety employees, occupational
exposure is a reality and it fairly treats both interests involved.222 The
person to be tested has the security of knowing that strict confidentiality
must be maintained or severe penalties will result;223 the exposed em-
ployee will, one way or the other, be able to make informed decisions
about future activities, such as whether to obtain prophylactic AZT
treatment2 24 or change sexual practices.225
The California Legislature should extend the occupational protec-
tions of Proposition 96 beyond the criminal context to health care work-
219. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3200, 3201, 3208 (West 1991).
220. First Healthcare Worker Occupationally Infected With HIV Dies, 12 CLINICAL LAB
LETTER 105, 108 (1991); Robert J. Fitzgibbon,,AIDS: Medical Groups Balk at Naming High-
Risk Procedures, MED. LABORATORY OBSERVER, Oct. 1991, at 9; Arlene Jech, A Case for
AIDS Testing, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 1991, at A25.
221. Fitzgibbon, supra note 220, at 9.
222. See supra part II.C.3.
223. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1284, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 684
(1990).
224. According to Dr. Julie Gerberding's testimony in Johnetta J., early AZT therapy
might prevent infection, but it is costly and has "'severe side effects.'" Id at 1267, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 672 (quoting Dr. Gerberding). Knowing the HIV status of the person to whom the
employee is exposed is an" 'important factor... to consider in deciding whether to subject his
or her body to this prophylactic treatment.'" Id. (quoting Dr. Gerberding). But see Law-
rence K. Altman, Study Says AZT May Not Stem Onset of AIDS, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2,
1993, at 1 (reporting results of Concorde study on ineffectiveness of early AZT treatment of
HIV-positive individuals).
225. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1266, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (testimony of Dr. William
Drew).
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ers.2 2 6 This will equalize the current imbalance in the law that forces
health care professionals to carry a disproportionate share of the legal
burdens. Recognizing this inequity, the Bioethics Committee of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association has taken the position that the legisla-
ture should "consider whether California needs additional legislation to
address [the] problem of the exposed health care professional who cannot
obtain information about the HIV status of the patient who is the source
of that exposure.
227
Health care workers are in the front lines of the AIDS crisis on a
daily basis. They endure the same anxieties and fears as anyone else con-
fronted with the possibility of contracting a fatal disease. Consider the
opinion of one of the medical experts expressed in Johnetta J. v. Munici-
pal Court:
228
Patients who fear an HIV infection "suffer extreme anxiety be-
cause AIDS is fatal.... [B]eing informed the risk [of infection]
is remote provides little comfort in the face of a lethal disease.
Patients are anxious to know the HIV status of the person with
whom they have come into contact. This information is useful
for both the treating physician and the patient. A positive test of
the person who may have infected the patient would inform the
physician that additional and more extensive monitoring of the
patient's medical condition is warranted than would be the case
were the results of the test negative. If the results of the HIV
test of the source is negative, this information may be useful in
helping to allay the concerns of the patient.
229
IV. CHALLENGES TO NONCONSENSUAL HIV TESTING
AIDS is a political and social issue in modern society, but it is also a
contagious fatal disease. Under current California AIDS confidentiality
statutes, health care workers may not divulge HIV-related informa-
tion.230 Because of these disclosure restrictions, it is fair to require a
226. Under the California Constitution, the legislature may not amend or repeal voter ini-
tiatives. CAL. CON T. art. II, § 10(c). An amendment to an initiative statute requires ap-
proval by the voters unless the initiative statute contains provisions that permit legislative
amendment or repeal without voter approval. Id. However, the legislature is free to enact
separate statutes to deal with this issue which would not amend the original provisions of
Proposition 96.
227. BioETHics COMMrI-rEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 175.
228. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
229. Ia at 1266, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72 (alterations in original) (quoting testimony of Dr.
William Drew).
230. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.21-.215 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
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patient to submit to an HIV test when a health care worker has been
exposed to the patient's blood or body fluids. However, any law that
permits a nonconsensual intrusion into the body will be subjected to close
scrutiny by the courts. If the legislature chooses to redistribute the legal
burdens between patients and health care providers, it is necessary to
examine whether such statutes can withstand federal and state constitu-
tional challenges.
A. Fourth Amendment and "Special Need"
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
people have the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." '231 Courts have al-
lowed governmental intrusions into the body to obtain evidence in crimi-
nal cases if there is probable cause to believe such a search will discover
evidence and if it is deemed reasonable.232 This was specifically applied
to the involuntary taking of a criminal defendant's blood for testing in
Schmerber v. California.233 The U.S. Supreme Court first concluded a
compulsory blood test was a search under the Fourth Amendment234
subject to probable cause restrictions. Probable cause was subsequently
found to exist, and the Court concluded that the search was reasonable
because the intrusion was minimal and did not subject the defendant to
excessive "risk, trauma, or pain." '235
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (incorporating Fourth
Amendment into California Constitution).
232. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
233. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber involved a motorist suspected of drunk driving. Au-
thorities collected a blood sample without first obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 758-59.
234. I& at 767.
235. Id. at 771. The Court also expressed the belief that the warrantless search was reason-
able because there was no time to obtain a proper warrant. The evidence would have disap-
peared by the time a warrant could be lawfully obtained. Id. at 770-71.
In People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978), however, the
California Supreme Court found that a court-ordered acquisition of a semen sample by pro-
static massage from a criminal defendant suspected of child molestation did constitute an un-
reasonable search. IAt at 294, 578 P.2d at 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881. This was because the
nature of the intrusion was found to be "very substantial," constituting a "very significant
invasion of both dignity and privacy," which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
Id. There also must be a clear indication that the evidence desired is likely to be found as a
result of the search. IM. at 295, 578 P.2d at 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
Likewise, in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held
that a state could not force an armed robbery suspect to undergo surgery to remove a possibly
incriminating bullet. Id. at 766. The Court held that this search was unreasonable because:
(1) The surgery could be dangerous for the defendant; (2) the intrusion by surgery was much
more severe than the mere taking of a blood sample as in Schmerber; and (3) the state had
other evidence that would be sufficient to convict the defendant. IM. at 765-67.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an unreasonable search to be
one that violates a person's subjective expectation of privacy;2 36 the ex-
pectation must also be one that society would recognize as "reason-
able. '237  Taking blood for testing can be either for criminal or
administrative purposes.238 Unlike criminal searches, in administrative
searches the probable cause requirement is relaxed.239 This is because
such regulatory programs are widely accepted by the public and the
courts; also this type of search is usually neither "personal in nature nor
... aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime."'4 ° Because the court-
ordered HIV testing under Proposition 96 is for health and safety reasons
and specifically is not to be used as criminal evidence, it is classified as an
administrative search.241
An administrative search, as defined in Camara v. Municipal
Court,242 is conducted for the purpose of obtaining information used in
regulatory schemes involving public health and safety, 243 monitoring
government employees244 or the business practices of "closely regu-
lated""24 entities. In Camara, which involved the search of a home for
health code violations, the U.S. Supreme Court established a balancing
test to determine whether an administrative search was valid. 246 The
need for the search is determined by ascertaining whether the search ful-
fills a valid public interest, which is weighed against the competing pri-
vate interest to be free from such intrusions. 247 If a valid public interest
exists to justify the intrusion, then a suitably restricted search warrant
may be issued.248
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the
"reasonableness" doctrine. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
236. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
237. Id
238. Bennett, supra note 133, at 1423.
239. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
240. Id at 537.
241. Bennett, supra note 133, at 1438.
242. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
243. Id.; see also In re Clemente, 61 Cal. App. 666, 666-67, 215 P. 698, 698-99 (1923)
(upholding quarantine and testing of owner of house of prostitution for venereal disease).
244. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (allowing drug
testing of customs employees); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (permitting search of
office and desk of physician employed by state psychiatric hospital).
245. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of statute au-
thorizing warrantless search of closely regulated businesses as applied to vehicle dismantling
operation).
246. 387 U.S. at 536-37.
247. Id
248. Id at 539.
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Ass'n, 2 4 9 the Court held that the usual warrant and probable cause re-
quirements may be suspended in the face of a "special need, '250 in which
"'the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmen-
tal purpose behind the search.' ",251 Most importantly for purposes of
analyzing Proposition 96, the Court also determined that in certain cir-
cumstances, "where an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspi-
cion.' ' 212 Therefore, even though Proposition 96 does not require a de-
termination that the person to be tested is likely to have the virus, it
passes the requirements established by the Court in Skinner.
Extending the protections of Proposition 96 to health care workers
fulfills an important governmental interest by enhancing occupational
safety when an exposure has occurred. Under these circumstances, a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion is unreasonable because it is im-
possible for the exposed health care worker to know a patient's HIV
status from the information in the medical history. Therefore, a statute
allowing nonconsensual testing of a patient for HIV when a health care
worker has been exposed is "reasonable" under the Skinner test.
B. Proposition 96 Survives Constitutional Scrutiny
Before the adoption of Proposition 96, there were few exceptions to
the strict consent requirements of the California AIDS statutes.253 For
example, in Barlow v. Superior Court,254 the plaintiff's blood was taken
for an HIV test without his consent after he bit a police officer during an
altercation at a gay rights parade.255 Although the plaintiff had alluded
to the distinct possibility of AIDS transmission,256 the court ordered the
test canceled and his blood sample returned to him.257 The court recog-
249. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
250. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
251. Id at 623 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).
252. Id at 624. This case involved drug testing of railroad employees to prevent impaired
workers from operating trains as an urgent matter of public safety. Id at 620. The Court
found that dispensing with probable cause and warrant requirements was justified because of
the "special need" to detect impaired workers. Id The balance was tipped in favor of the
government because the procedures involved in obtaining a warrant would result in the loss of
evidence: Drugs and alcohol would dissipate from the blood and urine over time. Id at 623.
253. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
254. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1987) (depublished opinion).
255. Id at 135.
256. The plaintiff allegedly told someone at the hospital, "'You better take it that I do have
AIDS for the officers' sake.'" Id at 135-36.
257. Id at 140.
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nized that blood may be taken under a properly obtained warrant,258 but
even if probable cause existed in this case,2 59 the court could not order
the test because of the California law prohibiting nonconsensual
testing.26 °
The outcome of Barlow would likely have been different after Prop-
osition 96. Though the results of the HIV test would be inadmissible as
evidence against Barlow in the criminal trial, the court still could have
ordered the test for the officer's protection.261 Indeed, a case with similar
facts, which arose after Proposition 96 went into effect, did result in a
decision favoring a nonconsensual test.262
The plaintiff in Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court 263 specifically chal-
lenged Proposition 96. Johnetta J. involved a defendant who was
charged with assault on an officer after she became disruptive in court
during a child dependency hearing.2 4 In the altercation that ensued
when a deputy attempted to subdue her, she inflicted a deep bite on the
deputy's arm, which drew blood. 26' The deputy filed a request in civil
court to order the plaintiff tested for HIV.266 Pursuant to Proposition
96, the lower court ordered the HIV test, following extensive medical
expert testimony.267 The plaintiff challenged the order based on Fourth
Amendment and California right-to-privacy grounds.268
Johnetta J. claimed that the mandatory HIV testing scheme of Prop-
osition 96 is a violation of the Fourth Amendment because: (1) The law
does not require probable cause that evidence of the virus will be found
as a result of the testing; and (2) the law does not allow for a balancing
test to ascertain "whether the character of the intrusion is appropriate to
258. Id. at 137 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-71 (1966)).
259. The court decided that the warrant was issued without probable cause because Barlow
was charged with an intent crime (assault with intent to commit great bodily harm); whether
or not Barlow had HIV would not be useful in demonstrating the requisite intent. Id. at 138.
260. Id. at 138-39. The court concluded that California law prohibited nonconsensual HIV
testing under such circumstances, as well as the disclosure of the results. Id. (citing CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20, 199.22 (West Supp. 1986)); see also Department of So-
cial Servs. v. Janice T., 524 N.Y.S.2d 267 (App. Div. 1988) (reversing court order to require
AIDS testing of defendant who bit bailiff, because no statute expressly authorized such order).
261. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990) (allowing mandatory testing
of persons charged with assault on officer); id. § 199.97(0 (specimens and results of tests are
not admissible evidence in any criminal proceeding).
262. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
263. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990).
264. Id. at 1261, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1263-64, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70.
268. Id.
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the circumstances. ' 269 The appeals court acknowledged that such test-
ing qualified as an administrative search under the Fourth Amendment,
noting that "'it is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' "270 However,
based on a Skinner "special needs" analysis, the court found that in this
case the balance was not in favor of the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment. 271 Establishing probable cause
that the person with whom contact was made is likely to be HIV-positive
is not practical in this situation because "in the vast majority of cases the
officers will have no way of knowing the infection status of the person
who has bitten them. 272
The plaintiff argued that in this case, taking blood for an AIDS test
was not a "minimal intrusion" because of the adverse psychological im-
pact a positive test would cause and because of the stigma associated with
it should the results become generally known.2 73 On this basis, she
claimed that Skinner did not apply and relied on a line of cases that
forbade searches of the body if the intrusion was more than minimal.2 74
The court, however, found that the strict confidentiality provisions and
the very limited disclosure allowed under Proposition 96 are adequate to
satisfy the "minimal intrusion" requirement.27 Additionally, the court
held that the governmental need, which included consideration of the
officer's apprehension about potential infection, outweighs any negative
psychological effects the plaintiff might suffer if the test were positive.2 76
The court also felt that the intrusion was justified because the medical
experts could not establish with certainty that HIV could not be trans-
mitted through saliva from a bite.27 7
269. Id. at 1270, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
270. Id. at 1271-72, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 530 (1967)).
271. Id. at 1284, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
272. Id. at 1280, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
273. Id. at 1277-78, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
274. Id. at 1274-75, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78. One of the cases petitioner relied on was
People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978), discussed supra note
235. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1274-75, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
275. Johnetta J., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1277-79, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
276. Id. at 1278, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
277. Id. at 1265-70, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 671-74. Although the risk of transmission was
thought by all expert witnesses to be "'remote,'" they felt it was best to "'err on the side of
caution'" because the disease is fatal. Id. at 1266, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (quoting testimony of
Dr. William Drew).
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Johnetta J. was also unsuccessful in claiming a violation of her pri-
vacy rights under the California Constitution.278 While acknowledging
her claim that this right is fundamental, 279 the court noted that "the Cal-
ifornia right of privacy is 'not absolute' and may be subordinated to a
compelling state interest. ' 28 0 The court concluded that given the risks to
public safety officers, the unique nature of AIDS, and the fact that medi-
cal experts could not rule out the possibility of transmission, the state's
interest was sufficiently compelling to overcome the right of privacy
against a minimal intrusion.281
In other cases, plaintiffs have challenged the nonconsensual HIV
testing permitted under the California Penal Code. Section 1202.6 of the
Penal Code allows testing after repeat offenses by convicted prosti-
tutes.2 2 For example, in Love v. Superior Court,2"' the petitioner con-
tested the testing requirement of the statute on Fourth Amendment
grounds.284 Relying heavily on the reasoning in Johnetta J, the court
found: "With the minimal intrusion of a blood test and the disclosure
restrictions, . . . the Fourth Amendment balancing must be struck in
favor of the testing requirement.
'285
Federal courts have also found that some circumstances may war-
rant mandatory testing. In Local 1812, American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees v. United States Department of State,286 the D.C.
District Court rejected the plaintiff's request for an injunction prohibit-
ing AIDS testing as part of an overall physical health exam required of
any person to be posted in a foreign nation.2 7 The court stated that such
a policy was reasonably related to an individual's fitness for duty, consid-
278. Id. at 1283, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
279. Id. at 1282-83, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
280. Id. at 1283, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (citing Boler v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d
467, 473, 247 Cal. Rptr. 185, 188 (1987)).
281. I
282. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6.
283. 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990).
284. Id at 740, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662. The statute was also challenged on due process and
equal protection grounds, both of which were rejected by the California Court of Appeal. Id.
at 746-47, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67. The court found no due process violation because the
statute provided for mandatory AIDS education, making possible the avoidance of an en-
hanced penalty for repeat offenses. I at 747, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 667. The equal protection
claim was based on the fact that a similar statute requiring testing of violent sexual offenders
contained provisions limiting disclosure of test results, but the statute under which Love was
charged had no comparable restrictions. Id The court dispensed with this contention by stat-
ing that the disclosure limitation applies with equal force to both statutes. Id.
285. Id at 746, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
286. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
287. Id at 51-52, 55.
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ering that many employees were to be sent to countries in which modem
facilities would not be available to treat the inevitable medical complica-
tions of HIV infection.2"' Although this case can be distinguished from
Johnetta J. in that the HIV test in question did not require an intrusion
into the body,289 the court found that it was not likely that the plaintiff's
constitutional claims would succeed.290
Additionally, the court in Plowman v. United States Department of
the Army29 found "even stronger justifications for the additional HIV
test."' 292 In Plowman, the plaintiff was a civilian employee of the Army
who was admitted to an Army hospital in South Korea after being in-
jured in an off-duty altercation. 293 His doctors ordered the HIV test
without his consent as a precaution because surgery might be required.294
Under existing policy, active duty personnel received only prior notifica-
tion of HIV testing; however, for civilian personnel the protocol required
both notification and informed consent.295 The court stated: "The medi-
cal necessity of informing surgical personnel of a patient's HIV status
might be sufficiently compelling to override plaintiff's privacy
interests.
296
A similar result was reached in Virgin Islands v. Roberts.297 A de-
fendant in a rape case objected on Fourth Amendment grounds to having
his blood taken for HIV testing.298 The court agreed with prior cases
that the actual physical intrusion was minimal, but was concerned with
the possible gravity of the harm to the defendant because of the nature of
the test being performed.299 Like the California court in Johnetta J., this
court was satisfied that disclosure of the results would be limited to only
the defendant, the victim, and the doctors, for purposes of medical
treatment.3 °
288. Id at 52-53.
289. Doctors had previously obtained the plaintiff's blood sample for other routine testing
as part of the physical examination. See id at 52.
290. Id. at 53.
291. 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988).
292. Id at 637.
293. Id. at 629.
294. Id.
295. Id at 629 n.5.
296. Id at 637.
297. 756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 1567 (3d Cir. 1992).
298. Id. at 901.
299. Id. at 901-02.
300. Id at 902.
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Another federal court found privacy interests to be diminished in
Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners.30 1 The Fifth Circuit ruled that a hos-
pital was justified in discharging an employee for failure to comply with a
long-standing policy that required appropriate serological testing of any
employee who had been exposed to an infectious disease.3°2 Leckelt did
not attempt to conceal the fact of his long-term relationship with a man
who had died from AIDS.30 3 Although he previously had been tested
voluntarily, he refused to give the results to hospital officials °.3  The ap-
pellate court agreed with the district court's finding that "'[the hospi-
tal's] infection control policies are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest of protecting patients and health care workers from the spread of
infectious or communicable diseases.' ,,30' The court also agreed that the
district court was correct in finding that the "'defendants' interest in
knowing plaintiff's health status far outweighed the limited intrusion of
requiring him to produce the results of a test he had already taken
voluntarily.' ,,306
The testing scheme in Leckelt can be distinguished from the one
that was overturned by the Eighth Circuit in Glover v. Eastern Nebraska
Community Office of Retardation;3 7 in fact, the Leckelt court made an
effort to do so. Glover involved a government agency that provided serv-
ices to the mentally retarded. The district court found that the agency
could not establish any risk to the patients, which was characterized as
"extremely low, approaching zero. '3 8 There were documented reports
of incidents of patient violence such as biting and scratching.30 9 How-
ever, the testing scheme was not targeted at individual exposure inci-
dents, but rather at groups of employees in specific positions.310 The
Leckelt court noted that the mandatory testing at issue in Glover was
301. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
302. Id. at 833. Although the policy was not targeted specifically at HIV, the court agreed
that it was broad enough in scope to encompass HIV testing. Id
303. Id at 826.
304. Id at 824.
305. Id at 832 (quoting Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1390 (E.D. La.
1989)).
306. Id (quoting Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1392 (E.D. La. 1989)).
Prior to the Leckelt incident, the hospital had tested one other HIV-exposed employee under
the infection control policy. Id at 826-27. This person, a nurse who suffered a contaminated
needlestick, voluntarily submitted to testing. Id at 827.
307. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
308. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D.
Neb.), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
309. Id at 245-46.
310. Id at 245.
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much broader in scope than the one then under consideration.311 The
defendant hospital in Leckelt only required testing of employees who
were known to have been exposed to an infectious disease such as HIV
(or, in Leckelt's situation, reporting results of testing already per-
formed). 312 The balancing test the Glover court employed concluded
that the justification offered by the agency for testing all employees did
not outweigh their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches.313
To summarize, both California and federal courts have upheld com-
pulsory HIV testing in limited circumstances. There is no doubt that
such testing is a search under the Fourth Amendment; however, when a
testing program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to target a specific risk
situation and disclosure is restricted to purposes of medical treatment,
the courts have had little difficulty permitting such testing. 314 The occu-
pational protections available to public service employees under Proposi-
tion 96 fall within these parameters,315 therefore extending similar
protection to health care workers should be acceptable as well.
V. THE SPECTER OF WIDESPREAD MANDATORY HIV TESTING IN
THE HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT
Suggesting that the occupational protections of Proposition 96
should be extended to health care workers does not mean that mass
screening of either patients or health care workers is endorsed. The pro-
posed testing should be limited to those situations in which there has
been a known exposure-when there is an actual risk involved. Such nar-
rowly tailored legislation would be unlikely to be overturned by a court if
challenged. The holding in Johnetta J supports this rationale.3 16 One of
the reasons the court upheld the compulsory HIV test at issue was be-
cause it was required by a "statute... narrowly drawn to respond to a
serious state interest" instead of "a blanket testing requirement of entire
311. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 n.23 (5th Cir. 1990).
312. Id at 833.
313. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 250.
314. See supra notes 262-313 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 262-81 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and holding of
Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990)).
316. See Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1284, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666,
684 (1990).
1287June 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
classes of persons. ' 317  This is precisely why the mandatory testing
scheme at issue in Glover 1I did not pass constitutional muster.319
Mass screening of patients to protect health care workers is usually
not desirable for a variety of reasons.32 First, it diverts scarce health
care resources into activity that produces few useful results, because
knowing the HIV status of a patient in advance has no bearing on
whether or not there will be an exposure. If universal precautions are
followed and all patients are presumed infectious to start with, nothing
more can be done to protect health care workers. 21 Second, the prospect
of undergoing compulsory AIDS testing when seeking treatment for an
unrelated condition may cause some patients to refrain from obtaining
needed care. Third, collection of massive amounts of data on the HIV
status of patients will make it much more difficult to keep the informa-
tion confidential, in spite of best efforts. 322 Finally, in low prevalence
areas "the predictive value of a positive result of any individual test is
low, because the few positive test results that occur will contain some
false positives. Thus, the percentage of false positives in a low prevalence
community will be much higher than in a high prevalence
community.
'32 3
317. Id
318. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
319. Id at 464.
320. The CDC now recommends that hospitals with high caseloads of AIDS patients offer
HIV testing to all emergency room patients and admissions on a voluntary basis. CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CoNTRoL, Recommendations for HIV Testing Services for Inpatients and Outpa-
tients in Acute-Care Hospital Settings, 42 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 157, 158
(1993). The rationale for this new recommendation is that screening will enable more individ-
uals at risk to obtain life-prolonging early treatment. Id. at 157-58; see also Associated Press,
Voluntary TestforHIV Urged at Hospitals, L.A. DAILY NEws, Mar. 5, 1993, at 13 (describing
CDC recommendations for HIV screening). But see Altman, supra note 224 (reporting results
of Concorde study showing evidence of ineffectiveness of early AZT treatment).
321. However, some of the new safety standards may not be practical in all situations. See
Lois M. Bruning, The Bloodborne Pathogens Final Rule: Understanding the Regulation, 57
AORN J. 439, 449 (1993). This is because in an unexpected medical emergency, a health care
worker may feel there is no time to don protective equipment. Id. It is also recognized that
the type and characteristics of personal protective equipment used often depends on the nature
of the task to be performed. Recommended Practices: Universal Precautions in the Periopera-
tive Practice Setting, 57 AORN J. 554, 554 (1993). For example, eye protection and face
shields are recommended protective equipment for all operating room personnel; however,
doctors who perform surgery using a microscope or endoscope cannot don protective eyewear
because this would compromise visual acuity. Terence M. Davidson & Bruce Stabile, Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Precautions for Otolaryngology---Head and Neck Surgery, 117
ARCHIVES-OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1343, 1343 (1991).
322. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 46
(1989).
323. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 248 (D.
Neb.), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); see also Furrow,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because of its early association with traditionally unpopular groups,
AIDS has become a politically charged issue.324 Despite massive educa-
tional campaigns to generate public awareness and compassion, discrimi-
nation against HIV-infected persons is still prevalent.3 25 For example, as
recently as 1991 a citizens group in California attempted to introduce an
initiative that would repeal city ordinances expressing concern about dis-
crimination against homosexuals and HIV-infected individuals.326 This
measure also would have required any future city ordinances dealing
with either homosexuality or AIDS to be submitted to the voters for
approval.
327
The problem for legislators and the courts has been to protect the
rights of the individual while at the same time recognizing a need to deal
with a lethal epidemic in an expeditious and humane manner. As one
court phrased it:
AIDS is a fatal, infectious disease; it is'not a political or consti-
tutional status. AIDS does not, therefore, confer on its victims
any greater constitutional rights than are possessed by victims
of other infectious or fatal maladies, such as herpes, tuberculo-
sis, or cancer. By the same token, AIDS victims do not forfeit
any constitutional rights by virtue of their AIDS status.
328
In the face of unwarranted discriminatory practices against AIDS
and HIV-positive persons, the legislature and the courts have acted af-
firmatively to preserve these individuals' rights.329 However, in its zeal
to protect some groups, the legislature has shifted the legal burdens to
health care workers.
supra note 11, at 839 (describing how false positive tests in low incidence communities consti-
tute higher proportion of total positives).
324. See, eg., 137 CONG. REC. S10,331-50 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (continuing debate over
mandatory HIV testing of health care workers); 137 CONG. REc. S9778-96 (daily ed. July 11,
1991) (debate over legislative proposals to require HIV testing of health care workers); FLAN-
DERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 41-44 (describing political debate over government role in
AIDS crisis). See generally SHILTS, supra note 1 (relating political reaction during early days
of AIDS epidemic).
325. Dunlap, supra note 57, at 913-17 (describing discriminatory practices directed at HIV-
infected individuals).
326. See Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, I Cal. App. 4th 1013, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 648 (1991).
327. Id at 1019-20, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650-5 1. The court held that the initiative was uncon-
stitutional on equal protection grounds because it was not rationally related to an important
state interest. Id. at 1026-27, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655-56.
328. Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 632 n.20 (E.D. Va.
1988).
329. See supra part II.C.1-.2.
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Currently, the risk of HIV seroconversion from a single contami-
nated needlestick is estimated to be approximately 0.4%.330 Health care
professionals are expected to bear this risk which, although low, repre-
sents the chance of becoming infected with an incurable and lethal dis-
ease. In the face of an ethical and legal duty to provide care, it is time
that the burdens be more equitably balanced between the health care
worker and the potentially infected patient. The California Legislature
should extend the legal protections now offered to public safety and cus-
todial employees under Proposition 96 to all persons whose occupations
put them at risk of exposure to blood or body fluids.
Denise C. Singleton*
330. FLANDERS & FLANDERS, supra note 1, at 20; Charles E. Becker et al., Occupational
Infection with HIV" Risks and Risk Reduction, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 653, 653
(1989). However, the risk of exposure to HIV-contaminated blood and subsequent seroconver-
sion may be significantly greater for some medical practitioners. For example, surgeons are
involved in a high number of blood-contact incidents, especially those surgeons who perform
trauma, orthopedic and burn procedures. Adelisa L. Panlillo et al., Blood Contacts During
Surgical Procedures, 265 JAMA 1533, 1535 (1991). This is because these procedures often
involve substantial patient blood loss, as well as longer periods in the operating room. Id. at
1536. Therefore, it is particularly important for these physicians to observe appropriate bar-
rier precautions. See id)
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